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           Victim  of  Sexual  Abuse  Fights  Back  Using  the  Anti-SLAPP  Statute  !! 
 

          Read the Decision......
 

The law firm of SJ Spero & Associates, P.C. represented a victim of sexual abuse by a physician.  A settlement was reached.  At the time of the settlement, the licensing board for medical doctors had already commenced disciplinary proceedings into the offending physician's conduct which had precipitated the original litigation. When the administrative investigation proceeded, the victim was served a subpoena to testify by the licensing board.  As her participation was involuntary, the victim did not breach the terms of her settlement with the doctor.  The doctor, however, sued the victim for breach of her settlement.  The lawsuit was dismissed in 1999 pursuant to the Massachusetts Anti-SLAPP statute. What follows is the decision of the trial court.   However, certain names and other identifying information have been altered to protect the privacy of those involved.


           Cecil D.  Medicinebag, M.D. v. Female Victim


           OPINION: MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON

           DEFENDANT'S SPECIAL MOTION TO DISMISS
 

Plaintiff, Cecil D.  Medicinebag, M.D. (" Medicinebag "), bought this action against defendant, Female Victim ("Victim "), to recover damages for purported violations of a confidentiality provision contained in a settlement agreement.   Medicinebag's seven count complaint seeks relief for breach of contract (Count I), fraud (Count II), common law deceit (Count III), intentional misrepresentation (Count IV), breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Count V), intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count VI), and interference with advantageous (business) relationships (Count VII).  Victim now moves to dismiss the complaint under G.L.c. 231, 59H, asserting that the actions complained of occurred during the exercise of her right to petition the government.  Victim further asserts Medicinebag's claims are barred because she is immune from liability under G.L.c. 112, section 5, as a "provider [of] information to the Board [of Registration of Medicine]."  Medicinebag responds that Victim's conduct concerns private, tortious behavior not within the protected ambit of 59H.  For the following reasons, Victim's motion is ALLOWED. 


   BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the pleadings and supporting and opposing affidavits under G.L.c. 231, 59H, see Bisognano v. Jain, 1995 Mass. Super. LEXIS 104, Civil Action No. 94-6879, 4 MASS. L. RPTR. No. 30, 671, 672 (Middlesex Super. Ct. 1995), citing Wigwam Assoc., Inc. v. McBride, 1995 Mass. Super. LEXIS 113, Civil Action No. 92-1570A, 4 MASS. L. RPTR. No. 21, 461 (Worcester Super.Ct. October 13, 1995), and not under Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) governing motions to dismiss. See e.g., Nader v. Citron, 372 Mass. 96, 98, 360 N.E.2d 870 (1977).

In 1996, Victim filed an action against Medicinebag, her former physician and therapist, in the Middlesex County Superior Court, Civil Action No. _________, alleging that Medicinebag committed medical malpractice and violated G.L.c. 93A. On April 23, 1998, the parties settled that action. As part of the settlement,   Victim executed a Release of All Claims (the "Release"), which specifically required Victim to "abstain from voluntarily participating in any investigations conducted by the Board . . . regarding Cecil Medicinebag" and to "maintain the confidentiality of the settlement and the specific terms thereof." The Release, however, also expressly permitted Victim to disclose "information concerning the settlement . . . to any public agency n1 entitled to receive such information according to its rules and regulations or applicable statute." (Footnote and emphasis added.) 


On 
June 11, 1999, the Chairman of the Board of Registration of Medicine (the "Board") issued a subpoena ad testificandum/subpoena duces tecum to Victim.  Pursuant to this subpoena, on July 7 and July 16, 1999, Victim testified before the Board concerning Medicinebag's professional conduct. It is Victim's testimony that gave rise to the instant action.  Medicinebag alleges that, in spite of the subpoena, Victim voluntarily appeared and revealed confidences in violation of the Release.  Victim filed the instant Special Motion to Dismiss asserting that her conduct was contractually and statutorily privileged and constituted a protected exercise of her right to petition the government under G.L.c. 231, 59H. 

  DISCUSSION

  A. Background of G.L.c. 231, 59H.



More commonly known as the anti-SLAPP n2 statute, G.L.c. 231, 59H was enacted to frustrate lawsuits ("SLAPP suits") that appeared to be designed to chill citizens' lawful exercise of their right to petition the government for redress of grievances. See Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Products Corp., 427 
Mass. 156, 161, 691 N.E.2d 935 (1998); O'Neil v. Gilvey, 1998 Mass. Super. LEXIS 578, Civil Action No. 95-6626, 9 MASS. L. RPTR. No. 11, 237 (Suffolk Super.Ct. October 28, 1998); Bisognano, 4 Mass. L. Rep. at 673. SLAPP suits are, by definition, meritless suits brought not to win them, but to use the litigation to deter, intimidate or punish citizens who either will or have "reported violations of law, written to government officials . . . [or] testified] before governmental bodies." Duracraft Corp., 427 Mass. at 161-64.

Specifically, 59H protects citizens by enabling a defendant to bring a "special motion to dismiss" if a civil claim against her is based on the defendant's exercise of her constitutional "right of petition." G.L.c. 231,   59H. The anti-SLAPP statute broadly defines a party's "exercise of a right of petition" to include "any written or oral statement made before or submitted to a governmental body in connection with any issue under that body's review; [and] any [written or oral] statement likely to encourage consideration or review by a governmental body." Bisognano, 4 Mass. L. Rep. at 673; G.L.c. 231, 59H.

Judicial review under 59H, however, is not automatic. Before this court may properly consider the merits of such a special motion to dismiss, the moving party, Victim here, must make a prima facie showing of the applicability of   59H.  See Lee v. Whalen, 1998 Mass. Super. LEXIS 321, Civil Action No. 97-1277, 8 MASS. L. RPTR. 14, 321, 322 (Bristol Super.Ct. March 25, 1998), and cases there cited. That is, she must at least present enough evidence to raise a presumption that the statute applies. See Black's Law Dictionary, Seventh Ed. (1999) at 1209 (defining prima facie). This burden is minimal. See Scotti v. Arrow Electronics, Inc., 1993 Mass. Super. LEXIS 120, Civil Action No. 91-2203 (Mass. Super.Ct. May 24, 1993).

Once Victim has satisfied this initial hurdle, the burden shifts to Medicinebag to show that (1) Victim's exercise of her right of petition was devoid of any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law; and that (2) Victim's acts caused him actual injury. G.L.c. 231, 59H. See Zoppo v. Foster, 1997 Mass. Super. LEXIS 444, Civil Action No. 96-2448, 6 MASS. L. RPTR. 25, 543 (Norfolk Super.Ct. April 22, 1997); Lee v. Whalen, supra. This court's inquiry is thus twofold: Does 59H apply to protect Victim's testimony before the Board? And, if so, does 59 warrant dismissal of Medicinebag's action? This court answers both questions in the affirmative. 


   B. Application of  59H.


  1.  Victim's  Burden.



To surmount her initial hurdle, as set forth above,  Victim  must show, and this court must find, that her testimony before the Board falls within the penumbra of protections afforded, and as defined by,  59H.  Section 59H protects citizens, such as Victim, by dismissing claims arguably designed to chill the right to petition the government or agencies of the government.  Medicinebag maintains that the underlying action concerns private concerns of contract, fraud, and misrepresentation and breaches of good faith and fair dealing, and thus has nothing to do with attempts to silence Victim from exercising her right to petition the government. n3

"The focus of the statutory test is not, however, on the plaintiff's claim, but rather on the petitioning activity that the special movant asserts bars the plaintiff's claim." Duracraft, supra at 165.  Victim  asserts that her appearance before the Board is such a petitioning activity that is protected by  59H.  As aforesaid, 59H broadly defines the "right to petition" to include virtually "any written or oral statements made before or submitted to a governmental body in connection with any issue under that body's review." Bisognano, 4 Mass. L. Rep. at 673. Neither party contests that Victim's testimony concerned "written or oral statements made before or submitted to [the Board] in connection with any issue under that body's review" or that the Board is a governmental or public agency for purposes of review under  59H.

Based on the aforementioned, this court finds that Victim has reasonably asserted that her written and/or oral statements made in the course of the Board's investigation were made during an exercise of her "right to petition" as defined, and as protected by 59H.  The burden now shifts to Medicinebag to show why Victim's special motion should not be allowed.

2.  Medicinebag's  Burden.

To withstand the instant motion, Medicinebag must show that Victim's testimony before the Board (1) "was devoid of any reasonable factual support or arguable basis in law" and (2) caused him harm. G.L.c. 231,  59H. If Medicinebag fails to sustain his burden, this court must grant Victim's motion. See id. This is "a nearly insurmountable barrier" to overcome.  Duracraft Corp., 427 Mass. at 162. n4 

Medicinebag argues that Victim appeared before the Board and voluntarily and tortiously disclosed the terms of the Release.  Medicinebag's argument fails for two reasons. First, Victim had a contractual right under the Release to disclose the information. Specifically, the Release provides that:

[Victim] and [her] attorneys will maintain the confidentiality of this settlement and the specific terms hereof. No information concerning this settlement may be disclosed, except that [Victim], or [her] attorneys, may disclose the terms of this settlement to any public agency entitled to receive such information according to its rules and regulations or applicable statute. (Emphasis added.)  Victim Aff., Ex. A, pp. 34.

It is clear that the Release permitted Victim to disclose its terms to "any public agency" and thus clearly contemplated that she may disclose the settlement to the Board. Furthermore, it is undisputed that the Board is a public agency that is entitled to receive information concerning the Release. See Levy, 378 Mass. at 524-25 (finding Board's role is to "take primary responsibility in the regulation of the practice of medicine in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts . . . to promote the public health, welfare and safety"). See also G.L.c. 112, 5(f) (imposing a duty upon the Board to collect information regarding "all medical malpractice court judgments and . . . all settlements of medical malpractice claims in which a payment is made to a complaining party within the most recent ten years"). Accordingly, to suggest that Victim breached the Release by divulging its terms is groundless.

Second, while it may be true that Victim did not maintain the confidentiality of the Release, it is unreasonable to suggest that, by failing to move to quash the subpoena, Victim voluntarily appeared before the Board.  Victim had a duty to turn over the Release to the Board, Mass.R.Civ.P. 45 (subpoena is a command to appear to testify and/or produce documents for inspection and failure to obey punishable by contempt). n5 

 

Based on the foregoing, it could arguably be concluded that the purpose of   Medicinebag's action was not to win it, but to intimidate Victim into refusing to appear and testify before the Board. In short, given the clear import of the Release, the uncontested fact that Victim appeared before the Board at its request, and the Board's duty to collect information concerning settlement of medical malpractice actions, this court finds that Medicinebag has failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating that Victim's exercise of her right to petition was "devoid of any reasonable factual support or arguable basis in law." The court need not reach the second prong of Medicinebag's showing, whether Victim caused him injury, at this time. 

  ORDER


For the foregoing reasons, after hearing, the court hereby ORDERS that the Defendant's Special Motion to Dismiss under G.L.c. 231, 59H is ALLOWED. The defendant, Female Victim, may submit an affidavit of attorneys fees for the purpose of assessing costs against the plaintiff, Cecil D.  Medicinebag.  See G.L.c. 231,  59H . 


DATED: _________________

Justice of the Superior Court

Footnotes


n1 The Board of Registration of Medicine is such a public agency. See Levy v. Board of Registration and Discipline of Medicine, 378 Mass. 519, 524-525, 392 N.E.2d 1036 (1979).

n2 SLAPP is an acronym for "strategic litigation against public participation." G.L.c. 231,  59H.

n3 Medicinebag's efforts to distinguish matters of private and public concern is unconvincing and are not supported by established legal precedent. See Duracraft, supra at 164 (holding, in no uncertain terms, that 59H applies to activity that does not involve matters of public concern). Accord Haddad v. Grossman, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 245, Civil Action No. 98-3064, 10 Mass. L. Rptr. 201 (Mass. Super.Ct. May 17, 1999). But see Sullivan v. Murphy, Civil Action No. 94-2866, 5 Mass. L. Rptr. 3, 67, 68 (Essex Super.Ct. April 22, 1996) (finding anti-SLAPP statute did not apply to private dispute as to the ownership of real estate); Bisognano, 4 Mass. L. Rep. at 671 (finding anti-SLAPP statute did not apply to an abuse of process claim arising from private dispute between two college students). Cf.  Commonwealth v. Chatham Development Corp., 1996 Mass. Super. LEXIS 194, Civil Action No. 95-3943, 6 Mass. L. Rptr. 76 (Mass. Super.Ct. October 22, 1996) (finding anti-SLAPP statute applied to private dispute where underlying litigation was concerned with defendant's prior claim before the Massachusetts Commission against Discrimination).

n4 Medicinebag contends that this court must apply the standard of review as set forth in Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). His position is misguided and not based on applicable law. He cites to and relies on Baker v. Coxe, 940 F. Supp. 409, 417 (D. Mass. 1996) (examining anti-SLAPP motion under the "well worn" standards governing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and "not [under] the hybrid statutory procedure in section  59H  which is more akin to a summary judgment motion.").  The standard of review under  59H  differs markedly from the traditional motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (Rule 12(b)(6)), or for summary judgment, (Rule 56(c)). See Margolis v. Gosselin, 1996 Mass. Super. LEXIS 335, Civil Action No. 95-3837, 5 Mass. L. Rptr. 283 (Mass.Super.Ct., May 22, 1996) at * 2 n. 1, and cases there cited. 

n5 She also had a statutory privilege to testify about Medicinebag's professional conduct.  See G.L.c. 112, 5 ("no person . . . who provides information pursuant to this section or who assists the board at its request in any manner in discharging its duties [including obtaining information concerning settlement of malpractice actions] . . . shall be liable in any cause of action arising out of the receiving of such information or assistance").



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